This study examines the role of states in developing contemporary extractivism based on recent investments and project plans in industrial forestry in Uruguay. This sheds light on several unanswered questions related to the role of the state and civil society in the governance, politics, and political economy of extractivism. The role played by states in contemporary extractive investments is a topic that requires studies that do more than simply analyse whether that role is strong or weak. Instead the focus should be on how states promote such investments, and on the political and socio-economic consequences thereof. Our analysis shows that the multiple roles of states need to be better understood when explaining the role of states in endorsing and expanding extractivism and its effect on the broader societal governance of business conduct. Our analysis indicates severe and negative developmental and socio-economic outcomes of pulp investments in Uruguay, which are hard if not impossible to transform as corporations can now use the investment protection lawscreated by the government to regulate the state conduct -to restrict the possibilities of civil society and state actions.
INTRODUCTION
Extractivism has a long history in Latin America, where even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the extraction of minerals such as silver and tin provided the region with foreign investments while impoverishing local populations (Moore, 2010) . Today, the term extractivism refers not only to mineral exploitations but to any economic sector (i.e. farming, fishing, and forestry) engaged in the large-scale extraction of unprocessed natural resources with few benefits for the locals (Gudynas, 2013) . The state role in these types of investments took a somewhat different form under the democratically elected 'progressive' governments of the 2000s, whose key policy was to fund social projects by boosting the growth of extractive sectors (Gudynas, 2015) .
In terms of the governance of these types of operations, there is an urgent need to understand and conceptualise how extractivism come into being, or is birthed, as we choose to describe theactive interaction of nation states and global corporations (see also Borras et al., 2012; Duit, 2014; Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015; Chomsky, 2016) , and how such relations affect the possibilities of citizens to engage in a meaningful debate on the desirability of these types of investments (Banerjee, 2017; Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2015; 2016a; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Valdivia 2015; Veltmeyer & Petras, 2014; Wilson et al., 2017) . What is the role of states and their governments in the governance of contemporary extractive investments? After a period during which the role of states has been seen as diminishing due to market-based global governance (Jessop, 2016) , is the role of states once again on the rise, and, if so, how is this taking place? Our study on how, through which means and state roles, extractivism is birthed, will provide answers to these questions.
By bringing in and developing established methods of institutional analysis of state-society relations, the article provides new conceptual tools for understanding governance processes in the extractive sector. By closely examining the corporate-state relations in the birthing of forestry extractivism in Uruguay, we illustrate the role states play in attracting these types of investments to their country, while often weakening democracy and/or causing negative socio-environmental and economic impacts. Our case selection and interdisciplinary conceptual work also offers political and developmental insights about the interplay between states and corporations in setting the boundaries of corporate social responsibility, while laws that are made to protect corporate operations are also an effective method of 'managing stakeholders', as they generally modify and curb the set of 'political games' (see Kröger, 2014a ) available to possible investment resistance. We illustrate how the law, bilateral investment, and direct agreements with the host government not only set the boundaries for how corporations can engage with their local stakeholders but also how these arrangements silence dissent and reduce the playing field in terms of how civil society can impact the conduct of global business operations (for an indepth discussion on how corporations impact civil society see Assländer and Curbach, 2014) .
The study is structured as follows. First, we unite and redirect classic tools of historical institutional analysis for assessing state-industry relations and roles with the existing research on extractivism. We focus on the state as an actor, utilising the concepts of custodian, midwifery and husbandry state roles identified by Evans (1995) . After this we discuss the field research methods and data, and review the existing literature on forestry extractivism, particularly in Uruguay. The subsequent section analyses the three mechanisms and actions we found to be most important in explaining how extractivism was birthed: the state's midwifery and custodian and husbandry roles in promoting a foreign-controlled pulpwood export model. Each of these roles are examined in the analysis section in a way that allows for a replication of this analytical model for similar studies in other contexts. A discussion section highlights how the simultaneous use of these three state roles has been instrumental for creating a foreign-controlled extractivist industry, and how their analysis can better explain this birthing than studies discussing state or corporate 'strengths' or 'weaknesses'.
We also discuss how husbandry is important for creating symbolic capital/violence (see Bourdieu 1991) , analysing the job creation discourses of industrial plantations through this lens. This helps reveal the true developmental and socio-economic impacts of these investments. The conclusions section connects our findings to larger theoretical and political debates.
The most important lesson here is that what matters the most is not whether the state is withering away, or is 'strong' or 'weak', but what kind of relation the state has with society.
Evans' book, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, was written in 1995. With the arrival of the soft laws promoted through global governance and CSR, it can be argued that the state's role has changed, yet it has not withered away (Jessop, 2016) . On the contrary, it is possibly even more present than before, shaping pre-CSR regulatory and legal frameworks, often moulding political dynamics to influence policymaking in the direction of favouring non-state mediated politics instead of those mediated by the state. Yet, locally, the role of extractive corporations in governance of social policies has increased (Wilson et al., 2017) , a seemingly paradoxical situation, whose birthing and political contours our analysis will shed light on.
There is an extensive ongoing debate on the political role of multinational corporations, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the governance of global corporate operations (Assländer and Curbach, 2014; Banerjee 2017; Matten & Crane, 2005; Matten and Moon, 2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2016) , wherein the focus has been mainly on corporate-society relations rather than on the role of the state -as the state is either perceived as static and as a taken-for-granted regulator of business conduct or as absent or weak due to the processes of globalisation (Scherer and Palazzo 2011) . To date, in this literature, the actual relationships between corporations and the governments that host these extractive operations, and the effect this has on civil society's capacity to engage in the regulation of business conduct (through national or global governance) has remained largely unexplored (Banerjee, 2017) .
Theoretical framework
In the political, economic, and comparative politics literature, the state is usually approached from two major perspectives: as an actor or as an arena (Duit, 2014) . The state is either emphasised as an important actor, which should be studied in detail as a social actor in its own right that can embed the markets (e.g., Evans, 1995) , or it is approached more as an arena of politics, where corporations, civil society resistance, and government agencies struggle and/or cooperate to influence economic policies through various political games (e.g., Kröger, 2014a) . Both approaches follow Karl Polanyi (2001) in asserting that, rather than emphasising the state and the society as separate actors, it is more important to study their interrelated relations, such as their 'encompassing embeddedness' (Evans, 1995) , or the 'political games' through which corporations, civil society, and governments define policy (Kröger, 2014a) .
The latest developments in state theory underline that it is very problematic to conduct coherent state analysis based on strength (and weakness) because there are so many contrasting interpretations as to what these mean (Jessop 2016) . The concepts of midwifery, husbandry, and custodian, (Evans 1995) are helpful to distinguish specific state roles as these concepts direct our attention away from misleading and simplistic questions regarding state size and strength, and towards fruitful qualitative and relational analyses. To use these concepts for the study of extractive industries is an original and additional contribution, as the bulk of the critical analysis of this sector has focused on political ecology, which relies heavily on textured, site-level analysis of non-formal organisations, at the expense of observing industry-state relations (Perreault et al., 2015) . Other fields, particularly the study of developmental states, have much to offer to this literature.
There have been political economic analyses of extractive capitalism, particularly in Latin America, and government policies supporting extractivism have also been discussed, especially through the notions of neo-extractivism and neo-developmentalism (Gudynas, 2015; Chomsky, 2016) . However, instead of making a structured assessment of how the government has birthed extractivism, including the forestry sector which is regionally important and the most visible form of extractivism in many parts of South America (in Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil, see Kröger, 2014a) , the existing studies have focused on minerals (e.g. Deonandan & Dougherty, 2017) , hydrocarbons (e.g. Valdivia, 2015) , or flex-crops such as soybean plantations (e.g. Oliveira & Hecht, 2016; McKay, 2017) , and on the general statesociety dynamics and impacts (e.g. Veltmeyer & Petras, 2014; Chomsky, 2016) . Uruguayan pulp investments provide a distinct case of extractivism when compared to most of the cases discussed in the above studies, which focus on neo-extractivist projects by so-called progressive governments, wherein these governments argue that the national state and society at large will benefit from the siphoning of the new resource rents to build welfare policies (as argued by the governments of e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, but also Brazil, Peru and Colombia, see Gudynas, 2015) . In Uruguay, we have extractivism that is located in transnational territorial spaces, mostly out of reach for tax collecting, and also in other ways providing little to welfare policy-building by comparison to some of the cases in the abovementioned studies, which are already criticised for their negative environmental, political, economic, and/or social impacts, at least at the sites of extraction, if not also nationally. We provide a structured analysis of the key roles of states in birthing extractivism; of forestry extractivism; and of a predominantly foreign-owned and controlled extractivism, which has little if anything in common with the assumed social distribution of the benefits of neoextractivism.
The analysis in this study departs from Evans' (1995) institutional analysis concepts, which were originally created to highlight the crucial role that autonomous yet embedded states play in enabling developing countries to become more equal players in the global political economy, to compete on a par with the developed countries. While Evans (1995) focused on the IT sector -for the good reason that the development of that sector as mostly nationallyowned via specific state measures is more likely to foster growth and well-being than investing in the primary sector -we utilise the concepts as tools of political analysis of the relation between states and a mostly foreign-owned extractive sector. Therefore, we do not share the goal of Evans (1995) to use his heuristic tools of state-industry relations to illustrate how to better foster 'development' (in the economic growth and a state's global power ascendancy senses of this term). Instead, we provide a novel insight into how and when these same policy tools can be used to foster underdevelopment, weakening national state and civil society power vis-à-vis foreign powers. This type of Polanyian analysis on the interplay of the free-market idea and the counter-forces to this (neo)liberal process has been a fruitful basis also in earlier analyses on the politics of the forestry industry, rural development and global capitalism (Prudham, 2008; Kröger, 2014a) . The kind of counter-globalisation agenda to forestry capitalism discussed by Prudham (2008) through the case of ex-workers mobilising in Canada, or organised landless and peasant movements' resistances in the global South (Kröger, 2014a) , has yet to be seen in Uruguay, which appears to be an anomaly. A closer examination of how the state plays a key role (or several key roles) in birthing this type of extractivism can shed light on why this continues to be the case. Evans (1995) distinguished four key roles a state can play in influencing industrial transformation: custodian, midwifery, husbandry, and demiurge. The state's custodian role refers to conventional regulatory actions. Midwifery includes, for example, the state's market-moulding techniques of erecting protective tariffs for new industries and providing subsidies and incentives, where 'regardless of the specific technique, promotion rather than policing is the dominant mode of relating to private capital' (Evans, 1995, p. 14) . Husbandry refers to 'cajoling and assisting private entrepreneurial groups' in the hope of making them globally more competitive and can take various forms, e.g., simple signalling. Husbandry is a helpful concept in examining the role of states in the legitimisation of certain business and investment models, styles, and paces, for the purposes of securing a positive image of a conflict-free -and thus risk-free -investment environment in global financial markets. Evans (1995) also distinguishes demiurge as a fourth type of market embedding action, whereby states form state-owned companies to compete or replace private corporations as producers.
However, as Uruguay did not have any state-owned pulp companies this role is not analysed.
Methods
The methodology selected is qualitative in its design and follows a case study approach in which cases are seen as bounded systems (rather than organisational units) with a focus on the specific issue under study (Langley & Rowey, 2006) : the relations that exist between states and (the birth of) extractivism and their implications for issues of governance and regulation of business conduct. Defining case studies as bounded systems offers flexibility in terms of methods used (ibid., 2006) , particularly regarding data collection techniques which contrast with more restrictive definitions that only allow the inclusion of data from living people (Yin, 2003) . Our material was collected in multiple stages over a period of twelve years (since 2005), and has a wide range of sources (see section 3.2. and the Tables).
Collection of Data
We utilise multiple sources to build a case for the state role in birthing forestry extractivism In addition to these interviews, recent media coverage (between 26 January and 20 February 2017) of the ongoing negotiations over a third pulp mill to be sited in central Uruguay has provided a rich source of data on how states engage with the forestry industry. It is, however, important to note that using mass media reports as empirical material may be misleading due to possible misrepresentations or the biases of editorial policy of the media house in question (Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2015) . The same caveat applies to data from interviews with activists, as well as texts produced by MNCs, which are affected by what the text producer chooses to focus on, particularly in such a contested area as the role of the state in extractivism. Thus, to increase the trustworthiness of our analysis it was necessary to collect additional primary data, including official government documents, sector analysis reports, and the legal documents the interviewees referred to during the interviews. We thus also analyse the relevant laws, policies, and strategy papers of the Uruguayan and Finnish states and the companies, as well as NGO material related to the state's role in pulp investments. Primary data was supported by analysing previous research, for example that on landownership in Uruguay. All the relevant material was gathered into a database to facilitate systematic analysis (see 3.3. Data Analysis). Tables 1 to 3 below detail the empirical data sources. 
Data Analysis
In order understand how the role of the state was represented in the different sources of material (newspaper texts, interviews, press releases by state and corporations) and to analyse the collected material, we draw on an interpretive method elaborated by Ehrnström-Fuentes (2016a). The analysis centred on identifying the different roles of the state in relation to the ongoing negotiations over a third pulp mill (and previous negotiations of the two first mills).
The analysis was conducted in four different stages: first, we made a list of all the texts used in the analysis (see Tables 1-3) , listing the sources of the texts and their geographical location (Finland/Uruguay), adding any reference made to the three roles of the state (coded as M for Midwifery, H for Husbandry, and C for Custodian, in the last columns of Tables 1-3) , assigning a code to each text to simplify the subsequent processes of analysis. Second, fragments of the texts that dealt with different roles of the state (M, H, C) were identified and placed in separate worksheets (one for each role categorisation). Third, depending on the position of the texts, they were then organised in three different columns (state, corporate, civil society positions). This overview made it possible to distinguish the effects that each role of the state produced at the level of (national and global) governance, and the political effects it had on corporate and civil society actors. The categorisation and separation of the fragments also made it possible to distinguish subthemes under each state role. Based on the findings we collected the most illustrative excerpts of each theme in separate tables. The quoted excerpts in the data tables were then translated into English by the authors from Spanish or Finnish. The tables consist of representative quotes from the database, to illustrate the different facets of the state's role, as represented in the data -the perceptions of state, corporate, and civil society actors are shown through quotations, to offer the viewpoints of differing actors on the state role. In the final stage of the analysis, we did a second focused search of primary material (official government documents, law texts, contracts and agreements mentioned in the interviews) to triangulate and validate the findings from multiple viewpoints and reliable sources.
Forestry Extractivism in Uruguay
The arrival of forestry as an industrial sector (plantations and pulp mills) has had a significant impact on society and the economy in Uruguay. The fairly recently implemented Forestry Law of 1987 (Law 15,939) initiated investments in forestry (Piñeiro, 2012) , making raw material readily available within just a decade and attracting further foreign investments to the sector in the form of large-scale pulp production facilities. During the past ten years two mills have been constructed, one is located in the city of Fray Bentos and is owned by the Prior studies have found the establishment of land control to be the most important condition for expanding exotic-species tree plantations: for this form of capital, it is essential to 'minimise any constraints on forestry as a land use', argue Le Heron & Roche (1985, p. 227) .
The expansion of forestry extractivism in Uruguay has been a process of de-nationalising land ownership, which makes the study of the state's role in this process especially interesting and important. It was not the forestry laws alone that contributed to the increased concentration of landownership in foreign hands. Changes in the rural lease law (which impacted on land-use policies) and in the law on ownership of rural property (establishing that agricultural property could be owned by corporations and not only by individuals), and the creation of the Investment Law in 1999 (encouraging large-scale investment projects), facilitated and escalated changes in the economic base of land use (from food production to raw material for the forestry industry) and in the structures of rural relations (Piñeiro, 2012) .
The case of industrial forestry makes Uruguay highly relevant for understanding the multifaceted role of states in birthing extractivism and the implications this has for statebusiness-civil society relations.
A further impetus for this study is the fact that the roles of the state and government have not received concerted attention in the study of Uruguayan pulp investments, most of which has focused on the communicational and conflictive aspects of the Botnia/UPM investment (but see Groglopo, 2012; Piñeiro, 2012 , for some notes). In previous research, most of the attention has been directed towards the Botnia pulp mill conflict between Argentina and Uruguay, producing literature that includes lessons for our study, and corroborates our claims. The Uruguayan state took a very strong stance against Argentinean criticism, defending the pulp investments as a national issue, and also taking it into international legal arenas (Kröger, 2007; . The conflict was used in many case studies to analyse the role of media and governments in legitimising FDI in situations where corporations had failed to attain social licence to operate (e.g., Fougère & Solitander, 2009; Joutsenvirta and Vaara, 2015; Laasonen, 2010; Lehtinen, 2008; Pakkasvirta, 2010) . Finnish media coverage was one key source of data in these analyses (e.g., Pakkasvirta, 2008) , which was justifiable because public discussion in Finland was a key explanatory factor in making these investments possible in the first place (supplying legitimacy to these huge FDIs by Finnish corporations, and supporting Uruguay and the investments against criticisms by Argentineans and others).
Research has also been conducted by Uruguayans on the developmental impacts of tree plantation expansion, Carámbula and Piñeiro (2006) , for example, finding it had quite drastic and not necessarily positive impacts on rural demography and job creation, which is in line with studies on the 'pulping of the South' (e.g., Carrere & Lohmann, 1996; Kröger, 2013; 2014b) . Piñeiro (2012) provides a broader analysis of land grabbing in Uruguay, while Rivarola (2014) explains the electoral politics dynamics in Uruguay that influenced the general turn towards supporting pulp investments among leading leftist politicians. Groglopo (2012) has written a doctoral dissertation on the Botnia/UPM FDI in the free trade zone, arguing that this is a sign of -and made possible via -'appropriation by coloniality' whereby northern pulp MNCs come to dominate the targeted regions, causing major socioenvironmental havoc. Yet this is legitimised by positive imagery spread by the corporation, alongside supportive state actions. 1 We explore the implications of this changing panorama of pulp investments in the discussion and conclusion sections.
Analysis
In this section we analyse the states' midwifery, husbandry, and custodian roles, respectively, in birthing forestry extractivism based on eucalyptus pulp production in Uruguay.
1 On the colonial legacy see also Kaakinen & Lehtinen (2016) ; the colonial-type relations of what are assumed to be benevolent Nordic agro-extractive capital have also been noted beyond Uruguay, e.g., in Africa (see Lyons & Westoby, 2014; Bergius, Benjaminsen & Widgren, 2017) and Brazil (Cardellac-Gulla et al., 2015) ,.
Midwifery
A variety of techniques and policies can be used when states play the role of midwives, the goal of which is to reduce the risks and uncertainties for a new sector or enterprise. Evans (1995) notes that providing subsidies and incentives is likely to be part of the midwifery role.
In the case of Uruguay we identified three key areas in which the state acts as a 'midwife' for the forestry industry:
1. Through the fiscal incentives, favourable loans, and forestry priority zone assigned to incentivise the planting of eucalyptus and pine trees, established by the Forestry Law from 1987.
2. Through the free trade zone benefits given to the pulp mills.
3. Through heavy investment (state and FDI financed) in infrastructure to support the logistics of raw materials and processed material.
In our analysis of the midwife role, we separate two key state roles in establishing pulp investments: first, midwifery is employed to create a stock of readily available raw materials via the expansion of tree plantations (legal framework and monetary incentives); and, second, it is used to create free trade zones, attracting investments in supportive infrastructure through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for the pulp industry.
When the state does things like offering subsidies and tax exemptions, it creates increased profitability for the extractive industry. Subsidies to plant trees creates the availability of cheap raw materials, a common feature in tree plantation expansion in the global South (Bull et al., 2006) . Free trade zones create benefits in terms of taxation. Infrastructure projects decrease transportation costs and risks for the corporations -this is especially important considering that a very large portion of the costs in pulp-making are incurred in local logistics; in Brazil wood procurement represents 40-70% of the cost structure in investments similar to those in Uruguay (Kröger, 2010, p. 220) . According to our data (below), the above incentives were important for the birth of the forestry sector (and later pulp mills) in Uruguay, and they are still vital to further growth of the sector as a whole; the state therefore offers forestry plantations numerous incentives through a mix of husbandry and midwifery.
The Forestry Law 'declares of national interest the protection, improvement, expansion, creation of forest resources, development of forest-based industries and, in general, of the forest economy' (Uruguay XXI, 2016 p. 21, italics ours). The declaration of this activity as in the national interest is a strong act of husbandry (see the next section for details on husbandry), although supported by midwifery in the form of incentives.
Most sources on the Uruguayan forestry industry agree that the impacts of the Forestry Law on the Uruguayan economy and landscape have been significant (Uruguay XXI, 2014; Paseyro, 2012; Piñeiro, 2012) The government has played a central role in the rapid appearance of tree plantations, now amounting to some 1 million hectares (the total area of Uruguay is 17 million hectares), with a total of about 4 million hectares designated as forestry priority.
The effects have been felt locally, as a farmer affected by the industry attests in the following excerpt:
'Besides, they made a law, the forestry law, for the needs of these companies, but they do not even fulfil it because one of the clauses of the forestry law, which I have here, says that land that isn't used for other things is to be declared forestry priority. But here clearly the land did serve other purposes; for all of us who lived here, before there was eucalyptus, there were other things here better than this. So, from the social and economic perspectives the land was better than this. … in the name of progress they transformed a place of work -with a lot of people working here -into a desert.' (Affected farmer, Interview, November 2012)
Thus, this rapid expansion of a completely new mode of production has had dire consequences for those living near to the plantations.
Besides the direct incentives to corporations, the pulp investments have been supported indirectly by the state's moulding of rural production patterns and farmer land-use choices. trees. There is a financial contract concerning how much land is left for the farmer, or if not they give all the tools to the farmer so that he can plant (trees) on his farm. On the one hand this leads to farmers being forced to produce commodities that are not traditional to Uruguay.
But they are also playing around with public acceptance, because then we will no longer be able to accuse these companies of foreignizing the land. What they do is to make sure that local producers are doing the job for them. So, this then becomes a conflict between society and the farmers that agree to plant ( publications (Uruguay XXI, 2014; . According to critical civil society voices, however, what the success story fails to mention is both the cost that this law has had for the economy (in terms of paid subsidies, through loans from development agencies) and the burden carried by those who do not benefit, and who do not want to benefit, from the rise of extractivism in the form of tree plantations on their land. Neither does the story reveal the experiences of those who sold their lands and moved away to make space for the new inhabitants of their homes, the tree plantations (interview with former farmer, November 2012). Thus, in the eyes of an increasing number of people, the state acts as a midwife to one sector while neglecting the obligation to protect and look after those vulnerable to the consequences of the shifts in the rural landscape.
Besides incentivising and supporting tree plantations, the state has also been central in birthing pulp mills in Uruguay. In comparison to Brazil, which has the National Development Bank BNDES, with a budget twice the size of the World Bank, which has funded about half of the new pulp investments in Brazil (Kröger, 2014a) , Uruguay has scarce state funds to rely on. But state funding has been found to be essential for the expensive pulp mills. As a Canadian pulp company director argued, 'Adam Smith's invisible hand will not build pulp mills' (Carrere & Lohmann, 1996, p. 103 (Abelando, 2016; Viñas, 2016) .
This developmental dilemma became visible in the recent heated debate on the quality of Uruguayan infrastructure, and the (im)possibilities of maintaining its (currently good) condition due to low tax returns (interview with NGO representative, November 2012). There is an increased need to invest in logistical infrastructure and the maintenance of overburdened roads, but less funds available for such work, so a growing number of people and outlets are querying the economic benefits for the host country (Viñas, 2016; Abelando, 2016; Dufrechou and Jauge, 2016) . The lack of attention given to the deplorable state of the roads transited by large logging trucks was already noted by locals in 2012 (Interview with Environmental Activist2, November 2012), while the lack of compensation from the large pulp mills to the state contributes to the lack of funds to maintain the roads (see also discussion on the attempts to collect a tax to be used for road maintenance under the custodian role of the state). Our findings reveal that regarding the pressure to improve infrastructure to meet the conditions of the pulp MNCs, the state is not only a midwife but also acts as an FDI magnet, by attracting foreign direct investments to the supportive industries which can deliver adequate infrastructure (the construction of railways, roads, harbours) (El País, 15 February 2017; El Observador, 26 January 2017; 9 February 2017).
A column in the newspaper El País published while the negotiations for the third mill were ongoing questioned this role of the state:
'It was enough for UPM to demand major public investments in infrastructure and fundamental solutions before committing to the eventual production of its future mill, for the president, as if by magic, to order his ministers to start working tirelessly… UPM made it possible. UPM wanted solutions, which put our national and regional governors to work in order to fulfil the demands of a multinational corporation... But we, who maintain the system and use the roads that are in deplorable conditions pay higher tariffs for poor services each day that goes by. May God help us, or UPMthat seems to be almost the same (Pepe Preguntón, El País, February 1, 2017 -signed with an invented name).
Thus, this role of the state also creates implications in terms of national governance: the presence of other foreign MNCs tied to the interests of the forestry corporations concentrates power in the extractive sector. It also increases the geopolitical interests of other nation states on Uruguayan soil.
Husbandry
Evans (1995, p. 14) defines husbandry as 'cajoling and assisting private entrepreneurial groups' in order to help them become competitive in global markets. He argues that husbandry takes various forms, from simple signalling support to creating synergistic promotional relations with entrepreneurs. In the context of forestry extractivism we find that the husbandry role of the state takes three different forms: promotional discourses, state visits, and cooperation agreements.
First, through its political discourses the government acts as PR agent for the corporations, touting the benefits that further investments in this sector will bring to the country, while simultaneously ignoring the adverse effects felt by some parts of the local population (i.e. El MNCs (Kröger, 2016) . However, such cooperation efforts, conditioned by the forestry cluster and the opportunities that arise within that field, also run the risk of structuring the imagination of future production modes. Instead, such cooperation creates new forestry dependent modes of production while other non-forestry related visions of the future become even more marginalised in the public debate (interviews with political leader, affected farmers, environmental movement activists, November 2012).
Custodian
Evans (1995) 'People started to see that Uruguay was confronting very high costs in road maintenance and they started to demand change because the roads were not made for the weight of the forestry company's trucks. There were demands that forestry companies should fund repairs to the highways. This was one of the main reasons for the new tax on property over 2,000 hectares; they had to pay a tax on their land. But the companies appealed after this change in the taxation policy, saying that they were protected by the treaties and the contracts signed with the government.' (NGO representative, interview, November 2012)
As the analysis above illustrates, the state operates in three different dimensions to support, promote, and protect the birth of forestry extractivism in Uruguay, and the socio-economic consequences such investments have had for the rural areas have typically been dire.
DISCUSSION
Next, we discuss the consequences the changing role of the state has for power relations, focusing on the political impacts on possibilities for societal governance of business conduct.
Despite the overlaps that might exist between the three roles of the state, here we discuss each one separately in relation to its effects on civil society's capacity to influence business conduct. Table 4 depicts the most important insights our analysis has produced regarding the state role in forestry extractivism in Uruguay. Our case shows how hopeless the situation is for those whose interests are not aligned with the corporations (and the state); that state midwifery enclaves locals into a particular production mode through policies and subsidies; because of state husbandry promoting industry interests locals do not possess the capacity to have an impact on the public debate; and, as a result of the state's custodian role, even if they possessed political power, the laws, contracts, and bilateral agreements restrict their sphere of influence over business conduct, now and in the future. State representatives take the role of promoting investments in the industry.
To create laws and agreements that protect the corporations from external financial, social, and political risks in the future.
Effects on national governance
Host governments locked-in and end up paying more than they receive in return.
Biased public will-formation, when all the voices of the powerful promote extractivism.
National legislation lockedin to serve extractivism interests.
Effects on global governance
State and corporate interests both aim to create extractivist operations.
State representatives become key spokespersons of industry in the global arena.
Protecting companies from being accused of acting against the local laws or engaging in shady business.
Effects on corporate position
Creates profitable and investment-friendly markets.
Political discourses promoting the industry strengthen the legitimacy (and perceived goodwill) of the corporations.
No need to 'go beyond the law' in terms of CSR when the law protects the business now and in the future.
Effects on civil society position
Creates local industrial enclaves: locals forced or cajoled into accepting the terms of extraction Silencing dissent.
Marginalizing those who have alternative views on how to live well in the future.
Democracy deficit, the business terms cannot change even if political power changes.
The strong role of midwifery, enacted through subsidies and state development policies, creates enclaves, dependencies in terms of modes of subsistence. This hampers the possibility of locally grounded social mobilisations since host communities are divided into groups of 'winners' and 'losers', crowding out modes of production based on diversity while introducing monocultures, with all the implications they bring to the broader ecosystem of community life. The spread of these types of monocultures transforms these rural communities into a new type of company towns, where the wellbeing of the whole community is dependent on the forestry sectors growing demand for raw materials, and thus tied to the growth of pulp production. This demand is further strengthened by continuous investments in pulp producing facilities and related fields in the forestry clusters labelled as 'bioeconomy'. Thus, when considering all the midwife measures in place that favour the continuous growth of this sector, it is not clear whether the local population, or civil society at large, can truly have a say about the desirability of these types of investments. The following excerpt from an interview with a farmer who was forced to sell his farm after the arrival of plantations in his community illustrates the feeling of powerlessness:
'We participated in several meetings but we were the rural and they the technical. We participated to make our point but they wanted to change our mentality. They made us graphs saying that the forestation was profitable, and that there was no problem with this, but we had already started to experience the problems. I mean, what they said there was a big lie.. They fooled the people with propaganda and money.
[.] Before, the local press used to write about this, afterwards they forgot us, as did the national press. Here we had various journalists that followed our story until they realised that the forestation just continued.' (Interview with a former farmer, 2012).
Intriguingly, this type of experience and/or reality of political powerlessness resembles the situation in the company towns of the past. The difference now is that the feeling of not being able to change this situation takes place not only in the localised context of the town, but also at the nation-state scale. As the power of extractive corporations has increased, they, instead of the state, have also come to be key actors in steering the governance of a host of regional social policy issues (Wilson et al., 2017) : this type of 'meta-governance' by corporations is often created by a series of seemingly contradictory state actions and roles, as analysed above.
Furthermore, when local smallholders and rural workers are incentivised to plant trees it does not remove the territorial conflicts to which these plantations give rise. Instead, conflicts no longer concern the opposed interests of local farmers and foreign MNCs, but are internalised as conflict between the locals themselves: between those who see the rural future as based on tree plantations, and those who continue to defend their territory against (forestry) extractivism. Such divisions among locals in combination with the territorial consequences of the spread of monocultures (scarcity of water, changes in terms of how the community is sustained) creates the circumstances that ultimately force the locals to accept the terms of extractivism either by selling and moving, or by becoming forestry farmers themselves (see also Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2016b; Kröger, 2014b) .
The marginalisation of voices that the state creates when it acts in the role of Husbandry makes it very difficult to raise awareness about the adverse impacts of forestry and to discuss alternatives to extractivism as the state's key 'developmental' strategy. Instead, citizens are stripped of their capacity to engage in a meaningful debate on the desirability of these types of investments for themselves and for their environment. Considered politically, when a president visits the head offices of the corporations during state visits (as happened in our case), this is likely to increase the legitimacy of the particular sector both at home and in the host country, at the expense of other sectors crowded out by the territorial expansion of tree plantations. Husbandry also silences dissent, a consequence which requires further study. The farmers, whose livelihoods have been seriously affected by the arrival of forestry plantations in their community, are left with the challenge of how to raise awareness of their situation when the political elites and the media choose to ignore their precarious situation (interview with farmer, 2012). To engage in deliberation from a marginalised or even excluded position is a difficult task (Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2016b) . This is surely one important explanation for why serious debate on alternative modes of production, let alone regulation of the growth of the forestry operations as a whole (plantations and pulp mills included), is currently very limited in Uruguay (Ehrnström-Fuentes 2016b; Ehrnström-Fuentes & Kröger, 2017) .
Industrial forestry, and its advocates, have created for themselves and enjoy symbolic capital.
Pierre Bourdieu (1991) claimed symbolic capital was a synonym of symbolic violence, conceptualising this as surging from a situation where the power of a social actor is mistaken for coming from accumulated economic, social, and/or cultural capital, and the actor is instead given authority due to a view that this actor is intrinsically good, honourable, and/or pursuing the common good. The creation of such symbolic capital is a powerful means to birth extractivism, and the state, in the form of presidents' (with their own symbolic capital) husbandry actions, plays a key role in this. Some legitimising discourses are particularly powerful in the modern world of development in creating more of this symbolic capital: job creation discourses being pivotal. These certainly deserve further investigation here, as the way to examine the structures of symbolic violence, and to make such a claim, is to show discrepancies between the discourses and realities of capital distribution.
Prior studies on the politics of employment related to South American pulp investments (e.g. Kröger, 2005; De'Nadai et al., 2005; Carámbula & Piñeiro, 2006; Cardeillac Gulla et al., 2015) illustrate a need to consider three inter-related issues when assessing job-creation:
1) It is important to take a critical look at the promises of employment, as typically the estimates vary wildly and do not correlate with the actual number of jobs created. In terms of exact employment figures of the pulp mills, different sources report different figures. In Uruguay, while it was initially estimated that the companies would provide between 3,400 and 6,000 indirect and direct jobs each (UPM 2014; Stora Enso 2011), official government sources indicate that the two pulp mills now employ a total of 2,491 persons (Uruguay XXI, 2016) , while others indicate only half of that amount (Viñas 2016) , and some even less (Abelando 2016; Nuñez 2016) . The total amount of indirect and direct jobs in the forestry sector according to official government statistics is 15,129 jobs, including forestation and harvesting and production of wood products (Uruguay XXI, 2016) . The construction of a third pulp mill has by the government been predicted to create another 3.000-5.000 jobs during the construction phase and when entering production the economic activity is estimated to generate up to 4.000 direct and indirect jobs with another 4.000 jobs categorized as 'induced' ('inducidos' in Spanish) not specifying exactly how this term differs from the indirect jobs included in the first 4.000 jobs (Presidencia de Uruguay 2017b). However, several studies suggest that pulpwood plantation expansion would produce less jobs than other available land uses, and may even create a scarcity of jobs. Such scarcity of jobs created by pulp investments has been particularly visible in the municipalities outside of the actual mill operations (Carámbula & Piñeiro, 2006; De'Nadai et al., 2005; Kröger, 2005; 2014a) ; however, even the municipalities of the mills may suffer: the unemployment rate in Frey Bentos where the UPM pulp mill is located is still reported to be above the average of the whole country (INE, 2017) .
2) What is or is not being displaced by the pulpwood plantations is a key issue. In areas where there is a high rural density and for example family farms, large coffee or fruit farms, or even large cattle-ranches, one hectare offers many more jobs than a hectare of a highly mechanised, seasonal, precarious pulpwood operation (Carámbula & Piñeiro, 2006; De'Nadai et al., 2005) . The figures for hectares required to create one direct or indirect job, based on the employment figures given by two pulp companies in Brazil (for the pulpwood operations), show that while 28-37 hectares were needed in 2005 for one indirect or direct job created by pulp companies, 2 one hectare created 1-3 jobs on the large coffee farms, and family farming created 1-5 jobs per hectare (see De'Nadai et al., 2005, p. 42) . The rural trade union leaders in our interviews in Brazil estimated that in ranching, about 8 hectares of land are required to create one direct job; but typically in these situations, the whole family can live on the ranch, having subsistence cultivation as well. When silvicultural operations do create more jobs than they displace, this takes place in areas that have not had many inhabitants before, where the destruction of the existing farm work is not the condition for pulpwood plantation expansion. There are some such areas in Uruguay, as studied by Carámbula & Piñeiro (2006) , but these are typically not pulpwood operations, which
show far worse socio-economic impacts than other silvicultural operations, such as the production of wood for sawmills.
3) Quality of the jobs created: the jobs related to large-scale pulp investments in South America, including Uruguay, are of a temporary nature, and are typically outsourced, precarious, and 'floating', requiring the part-time worker to move. This outsourcing and the precarious nature of the work is not a recent trend in industrial forestry, but has been one of the bases through which monocultures, such as tree plantations, have been developed in South America since their inception (Gonçalves, 2001, p. 220 ). In the non-pulp based silvicultural operations, the workforce is not turned into the precarious situation of a floating labour mass in the same way as is typical in the pulpwood sector (Carámbula & Piñeiro, 2006) . Pulpwood plantation workers in Uruguay typically live in urban peripheries. In Uruguay, studies comparing socioeconomic and health indicators of rural and urban workers have demonstrated that the worst indicators, across all observed categories, were to be found among the workers employed in silvicultural operations: the occurrence of poverty among these workers was the highest of all the studied workers (urban and rural) in Uruguay, almost 135%
higher in comparison to non-rural paid laborers (Cardeillac Gulla et al., 2015) .
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There seems to be a gap between job promises and delivery, and thus symbolic capital in operation, which would need to be addressed and discussed to improve the situation. (O'Faircheallaigh, 2013; Kröger, 2014a) .
Our findings parallel and add further detail to the study by Mäkinen and Kasanen (2016) who argue that the extended power of global corporations undermines people's political autonomy. This is particularly the case for those rural citizens who do not wish to act as host for these investments and who are most severely hit by states siding with corporate interests.
Because of the place that a forestry-based bioeconomy future still holds in many political imaginaries (Kröger, 2016) , and due to all the roles that the state takes on (midwifery, husbandry, custodian) to side with the corporations, the voices of opponents have become more marginalised with few opportunities to engage on equal terms in the political debate, or to make actual changes once investments have been granted their operative licence by the state.
CONCLUSIONS
We have illustrated how the state of a small, stable, democratic country is central in making extractivism possible. By supporting (through midwifery), promoting (through husbandry) and protecting (through its custodian role), the state creates the foundations for extractivism, legitimises the presence of corporations and protects their interests now and in the future. The losers in this equation are those adversely affected by it and, more broadly, civil society at large. The state's active role thus also restricts the possibilities of civil society to put pressure on the government to regulate these types of business operations and their developmental and political outcomes.
We reviewed the existing studies and other available material on the socio-economic outcomes of pulp investments in Uruguay, and discussed how the state's role in promoting these mostly negative developmental outcomes has also curbed political possibilities by exacerbating unequal power relations, and making these invisible. We discussed how in pulpwood operations not as many jobs are created as are promised/expected; that these jobs are of poor quality; and that they often come at the expense of existing rural jobs by expanding eucalyptus plantations. However, the developmental dimensions and politicaleconomic impacts go far beyond these kinds of job-related analyses. In terms of governance and impacts on rural citizens' life, the arrival of these types of investment is far more complex than the supposed creation of direct and indirect jobs. The whole rural community changes as property prices increase, and modes of production change from food production for local markets to commodity based production, which impacts fluctuations in the influx of capital and job creation (see Oyhantçabal & Sanguinetti, 2017) .
Our findings indicate that the regulation of business conduct through the active engagement of civil society is seriously flawed when states become the extended arm of global extractive corporations. States play an active role particularly by making laws that favour multinational corporations. CSR in this sense should be understood not as something that corporations perform beyond or within the law (Carroll 1991; Matten and Crane, 2005; Matten and Moon, 2008) , but as something highly volatile and dependent on the role of states in corporate-society relations. A hierarchy of laws must also be considered when analysing how laws protecting international investment take precedence over human rights and environmental laws, marking the territory for how much CSR interventions are needed to legitimise the presence of the corporation in the local sphere and thus condition the platform of state-business relations. When a law that creates tax free and free trade zones is created, that law, paradoxically, no longer regulates business conduct. Instead, wielded by the corporation, such laws actually start to regulate the state.
What is the state today? On the one hand, the modern nation state still assumes the important function of safeguarding the security of its citizens (as both Weber [1904 -1911 ] and Foucault [1974 argued), yet the state is also a provider of a regulatory environment that marks the boundaries of investment opportunities for global corporations within the national territory of its jurisdiction. It is too hasty to assert that the state has atrophied, as for example some CSR scholars have argued (see Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Scherer et al. 2016) ; instead, our attention must be turned to how the role of the state is changing. Our case study illustrates that the state's role is fundamental to the birthing of extractive investments, even when that extractivism is based largely on multinational capital. We have presented some of the key state-society relations that explain how extractivist MNC FDI is birthed.
Paradoxically, the global processes of MNC FDIs and market globalisation that are often seen as a hammer pounding states into inexistence or triviality, seem to have awakened the state into taking a pro-active role in attracting these investments. Jessop (2016, p. 230) argues that the 'superprotection for capital', created through neoliberal policies, and particularly secret international trade deals, limits the 'territorial and temporal sovereignty of national states.'
What's more, Sevilla-Buitrago (2015 , p. 1008 , studying the capitalist formation of enclosures, has argued that global South states 'usually mobilize their sovereignty to create schemes that actually undermine it, by surrendering normative and economic prerogatives to land investors'. The case of pulp investments in Uruguay, a country once hailed as the Switzerland of Latin America, illustrates this general trend that rescales 'quasi-constitutional protections for capitalist enterprises' (Jessop, 2016, p. 230) to the international level, thus removing power from national politics. While the proximate causes for this would need to be further studied by considering, for example, ideology and the financial aspects of the puzzle, our findings suggest that the relation between international market forces and state forces is more complex than first assumed.
This paper has made a distinctive contribution to the rural social science literature by indicating that the power of extractivists is created to large extent by three supporting state roles: midwifery, custodian, and husbandry. This study of the role of states in extractivism is important in providing a more detailed (and called for) analysis of the varied ways in which global land grabbing (Borras et al., 2012) and enclosure regimes (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015) are expanded in practice. Following this, of key importance for those seeking to level the playing field would be to target, criticise, redesign and govern these state-corporate relations and mechanisms of creating extractivists' power. The distinction between key state roles in birthing neoliberal extractivism is a contribution to rural studies, and points towards a way of tackling state-transnational collusion.
The positive developmental impacts are very minimal in the case of Uruguayan pulp investments, with even President Vázquez emphasising (temporary) skilled job creation as the main beneficial outcome (see YLE, 13 February 2017) . This suggests that having state actors pursuing the state roles of midwifery and husbandry and eschewing the traditional role of custodian (regulating corporations, rather than allowing corporations to regulate government actions) can lead to hidden impacts if the investment model and sector being promoted is not carefully selected. Evans' (1995) whole idea in focusing on the IT sector was to make the argument that even less developed states can escape the Ricardian need to pursue merely their 'competitive advantage'. The choice of birthing an extractive industry that focuses on producing raw materials of low value -eucalyptus trees to be transported to the pulp mills (the pulp is not exported by Uruguay but is processed and shipped abroad via the transnational free trade zones) -suggests that both the sector and the investment model, whose boundaries the state sets, have been developmentally suboptimal. This illustrates that small countries, even democratic and stable ones, may be underpowered in the face of the global players' rush to control land and resources. A key reason for this has been that civil society has not been included in political-economic decision-making, in other words, this has not been a case of 'encompassing embeddedness' (see Evans 1995) but one of exclusive state-corporate embeddedness (with the companies embedding the state even more than vice versa; on autonomy, see Kröger, 2014a ). Yet, as we studied the ongoing negotiations for the third large pulp investment in Uruguay, we found that the civil society debate on these issues is changing. Civil society has started to make stronger demands, with regard to how both the state and the corporations act towards the local population. It is possible that this budding activism will ultimately leave a notable mark on investment outcomes.
This article has focused on the question of how states birth extractivism; future studies should delve more deeply into why they do this. In doing so, the role of financial institutions will be important to take into consideration: what are their roles in supporting, promoting, and protecting these types of rural investments? We did not study the role of labour unions and other larger conglomerations in the birth of extractivism which is another avenue of future research. State regulation, such as bilateral investment protection deals, is increasingly protecting companies from state-mediated politics. Could finding a way out of this locked-in and enclaved position ultimately be down to local social movements across the world forming 'translocal governance networks' (Banerjee, 2017) , where communities connect with other rural communities and local actors and demand changes in how business is done (Moyo & Yeros, 2005) ; as well as seeking to control the corporations in areas outside state sovereignty and regulation (in free trade zones) via new globally binding rules?
